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Abstract—Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) was 
developed to resolve the IPv4 address exhaustion 
problem and support new features. However, IPv6 still 
comprises some defectiveness of IPv4 protocol such as 
multimedia security.  This paper presents IPv6-based 
tunneling mechanisms for securing Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) network traffic using OpenSwan IPSec 
(site-to-site). IPSec with Triple Data Encryption 
Algorithm (3DES) is used to create a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) on top of existing physical networks. 
Secure communication mechanisms can therefore be 
provided for data and control information transmitted 
between networks. Secure VoIP-oriented mechanisms 
on VPN IPv6 have been designed, implemented and 
tested successfully using open source approaches. The 
performance of the IPv6 VoIP network is assessed 
experimentally in terms of several performance metrics 
including jitter, throughput and packet loss rate. The 
obtained results revealed that the proposed IPv6-based 
tunneling mechanisms for VoIP have negligible impact 
on network performance when compared to the 
previously reported work in literature, with a slight 
increase in the price of CPU and memory resources.  
Keywords—IPv6 tunneling; IPSec; OpenSwan; Security; 
VoIP; VPN; OpenSwan.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Rapid growth in the development of network-
based computer system and the Internet has 
contributed to the depletion of IPv4 address space. 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has 
developed IPv6 as an upgrade of IPv4 as a plan to 
satisfy the perpetual increase in the Internet Protocol 
(IP) address needs [1]. IPv6 uses a 128-bit address 
which is allowed for 3.4×1038 addresses, enough for 
high usage for everyone in the world [2]. There are 
many advantages of the migration from IPv4 to IPv6, 
such as large address space, the capability of 
including media access control (MAC) addresses into 
IP addresses, enhanced security, mobility, 
streamlined encapsulation, transition capabilities, 
increase in network management and routing 
efficiency [3]. Considering the fact that there are 
many orginizations still using IPv4, deploying both 
IPv4 and IPv6 at the same time using the tunneling 
method is the best solution to overcome the migration 
process. IETF has created several tunneling methods 
such as Toredo, 6to4 and manual configuration [4]. 
Despite the benefits of using IPv6, there are still 
challenges and obstacles in implementing and 
practically using IPv6 VoIP [5]. The  issues of the 
transition from the current IPv4 network to IPv6 as 
well as VoIP performance for both IP versions need 
to be assessed and compared. 
Evaluation of VoIP performance with IPSec in 
IPv4, IPv6 and 6to4 networks using Teredo for NAT 
traversal in a test LAN was previously reported in 
[6]. The testbed used softphones to setup calls, and 
background traffic was generated to create congestion 
on the links and routers. The results demonstrated the 
feasibility of using a single Linux box to handle 
IPSec, 6to4 and NAT processing, and it was found 
that voice quality is acceptable as long as the traffic 
does not exceed network capacity.The study also 
showed that VoIP performance with IPSec is not 
adversely affected by the overhead due to 6to4 or 
Teredo. In [7], experiments in a LAN environment 
were carried out to determine the impact of IPSec and 
6to4 mechanism on VoIP quality. The repored results 
showed that VoIP quality due to using IPSec with 
6to4 mechanism and NAT in VPNs is negligible for 
both IP versions.  
Evaluation of the transition mechanisms namely 
6to4 tunneling in terms of data transmission was 
reported in [8]. A user-to-user network performance 
software was used to obtain the throughput, round 
trip time and tunneling overhead for transmission 
control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol 
(UDP). The performance of TCP and UDP through 
6to4 and tunnelling was then compared over the 
native IPv4 and IPv6 environments. The findings 
proved the ease of TCP and UDP data transmission 
via the tunnel compared to both native networks. In 
[9] and [10], IPv4 security was implemented using 
various encryption algorithms [11] - [13], including 
utilization of open source software [14]. In this study, 
the overhead of an IPSec concerning IKE/ISAKMP 
key exchange showed that it was much larger than 
the ESP overhead. In [15], IPv6 IPSec VPN in Linux 
with OpenSwan was built and analyzed within the 
whole frame and modules of OpenSwan, then the 
Linux kernel recompiled to make it support IPv6, and 
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NETKEY module also been added. In the end, 
OpenSwan has been installed and configured with 
net-to-net mode. 
Performance of 6to4 tunnelling without IPSec for 
TCP/UDP traffic was evaluated in [16] and [17], and 
it is found that the additional overhead due to 
tunneling was minimal but delayed reading was 
significantly different depending on the choice of 
transition mechanism and operating system used. An 
evaluation of IPSec with 6to4 mechanism is reported 
in [1]. The impact of this mechanism on end-to-end 
user application performance was studied using 
metrics such as throughput, latency, host CPU 
utilization, TCP connection time and number of TCP 
connections per second that a client can establish 
with a remote server. However, the study does not 
address VoIP performance. The experiments reported 
in [18] showed that the implementation of an IPSec 
VPN had a higher impact on smaller packets as 
compared to larger packets for both IPv4 and IPv6. 
The tests also showed that IPSec protocol has 
security advantages with minimal performance costs. 
In [19], the study compared VoIP performance on 
IPv4 and IPv6 LANs with the presence of 
background UDP network traffic, using open-source 
software. Results showed that the maximum jitter for 
IPv6 is slightly higher than that of IPv4, during high 
levels of background traffic while throughput for 
IPv6 is slightly faster than for IPv4.   
This paper proposes an IPv6-based tunneling 
mechanisms for securing VoIP with 3DES encryption 
algorithm using open source approaches, and the 
focus will be on measuring the jitter, network 
throughput and packet loss with the variable packet 
size of background UDP traffic. VoIP performance 
over IPv4 and IPv6 will  then be compared to assess 
the differences in terms of the requires system 
resources and impact of the larger IPv6 packet’s 
header and packet payload. Unlike previous studies, 
this study focuses on open source configuration by 
building real traffic testbed network, and measuring 
the VoIP performance with the implementation of the 
IPSec encrypted using OpenSwan IPSec with 3DES 
encryption. The VoIP performance and the impact of 
tunneling mechanism with and without the 
implementation of IPSec security are investigated 
using both IPv4 and IPv6.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows.  Section II overviews various VoIP security 
aspects including potential threats and encryption 
algorithms. Section III describes the test network 
used in this study. In Section IV, configurations of 
IPv6 tunneling mechanisms are reported. Section V 
presents and discusses the obtained results. Finally, 
the work is concluded in Section VI. 
II. VOIP SECURITY 
In VoIP networks, security has been a major 
concern and challenge, hence as VoIP deployments 
become more popular and widespread, it becomes a 
more attractive target for aggressive activities. 
Security issues related to VoIP need to be addressed, 
such as authentication, integrity and privacy. The 
authentication process ensures that each participant in 
the conversation which indeed the persons claim to 
be, the integrity process will check and validate 
whether the data and contents in the conversation has 
been compromised while transported between sender 
and receiver. Privacy is ensured by using encryption 
and decryption method in order to protect the data 
from interception and alteration.  
A. VoIP Security Threats 
The most common security threats and 
vulnerabilities against VoIP deployments, services, 
applications and end-users are outlined briefly as 
follows: 
1) Social threats: It consists of misrepresentations 
of identity, authority, right and contents, mostly 
aimed directly against humans. This attack may lead 
to actions such as phishing, theft of service, unwanted 
contact or spam. 
2) Eavesdropping, interception, and modification 
threats: An eavesdropping attack is defined as a 
method where an adversary can unlawfully and 
without authorization, capture the entire signalling 
and/or data stream between VoIP end users and 
participants. The attacker can then read and modify 
data sent on the VoIP networks unless incrypted.  
3) Denial of services threats: Considered as 
interruption of a service which included Denial of 
Services (DoS) and physical intrusion. The potential 
of this attack is to deny users access to VoIP services, 
exploiting flaws in a call setup or in the 
implementation of services. The attack may also 
involve direct attack with physical and infrastructure 
components, for example Domain Name Server 
(DNS) and the Session Initiate Protocol (SIP) server. 
4) Services abuse threats: This threat could be 
from a customer or employee of an ISP or a third 
party that improperly uses  VoIP services. For 
example, traffic is artificially increased for the 
purpose of maximizing charges for billing or the 
other way around which is to reduce the billing 
charges. Others service abuse includes various forms 
of identity and account theft where the credentials of 
the rightful owner have been exploited and misused.  
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5) Physical access threats: Inappropriate and 
unauthorized physical access to VoIP devices or 
equipment are considered as a physical access threat, 
the attacker may tamper and gain access to any 
physical layer of the network. 
6) Interruption of services  threats: Problems 
which refer to non-intentional problems that can 
possibly contribute to inaccessibility of VoIP services 
for example, are loss of power due to weather and 
caused by nature, resource limitation caused by over-
subscription and degraded call quality related to 
performance issues. 
B. VoIP Encryption Algorithms 
In VoIP encryption, several algorithms have been 
proposed and implemented to provide privacy, 
integrity and security during data communication and 
voice conversations. Block cipher encryption, such as  
DES, 3DES, AES and Blowfish among the common 
symmetric key encryption algorithms used to secure 
VoIP communication and services. In the present 
work, the 3DES encryption is adopted in the test 
network under investigation. The 3DES encryption 
algorithm was previously developed in 1998 as a 
replacement for DES; it used three round messages, 
which provides a stronger encryption by using 2168 
possible combinations. By using 48 rounds in its 
computation and a key length of 168 bits, more 
security was obtained when compared with a 
previously reported DES encryption algorithm [20].  
Fig. 1 shows a functional diagram for an 
improved algorithm based on 3DES encryption 
design in which the 3DES uses 3-times iteration of 
the DES encryption, hence increasing the encryption 
level with the penalty of increasing the average 
processing time. The 3DES and AES encryption 
algorithms are used in [20], [21] to evaluate the voice 
quality in wireless LAN. Similarly, 3DES algorithm 
was implemented in this work in IPSec experiment 
using LAN environment, benefiting from previous 
findings reported by the authors in [22]. In this study, 
a particular focus is given to  the IPv6-based 
tunneling mechanisms. 
III. TEST NETWORK AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The test network has been designed and 
implemented as shown in Fig. 2, by using internet 
connection provided by Internet service provider 
(ISP). Several PCs are installed and configured with 
open source software. Internet connection was routed 
to our test network by using main Router #3 as 
provided by the ISP. Two different LANs were 
routed using Ubuntu Linux Router #1 and Router #2, 
with 100mbps Ethernet switches connected. An open 
source VoIP application; Ekiga softphone was 
installed on both clients and voice calls are made and 
established between each LAN.  
 
Fig. 1. Three DES encryption design [11] 
 
 
Fig. 2. Test network 
Ekiga [23] is one of the well-known open sources, 
that establishes VoIP on Linux machines. It supports 
IPv6 and performs well under different operating 
systems. Router#1 and Router#2 use Ubuntu Linux 
12.06 as the main operating system, while Router#3 
represents the service provider end. The graphical 
user interface (GUI) of Router#1 and Router#2 
packets activity can be accessed through Wireshark 
virtualization terminal, it can also be used as 
verification and validation for IPSec encryption. 
Wireshark Analyzer [24] are used to capture network 
traffic data and perform offline packet analysis. 
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The packet generator software is used to provide a 
sequence of packets on the Ethernet link to represent 
network background traffic. As a voice call is 
established between Client #1 and Client #2, VoIP 
traffic is competed with background UDP traffic sent 
by a pair of PackETH [25] traffic generator within 
each LAN. The GUI of PackETH 1.8.1 that supports 
adjusting UDP background traffic is used to  assess 
the impact of background-traffic speed on the packet-
loss ratio on VoIP network. 
Numerous tools are available to measure the 
network traffic performance either by active or 
passive techniques. For example, Jperf [26] is one of 
active techniques that provide various parameters 
related to timing, buffers and protocols was used as 
the main measurement tool to perform in this test 
bed. It was the front-end of Iperf [27] which was 
written in the Java programming language. In this test 
bed, Jperf was also installed and set up on client #1 
and client #2. During the call set up made between 
these two nodes (Clients #1 and 2#), Jperf was 
operated based on the UDP packet size sent from 
each client to produce network throughput and jitter 
values. In thist  test, variable packet size that ranges 
from 128 to 1408 Kbytes were used, as suggested in 
[28]. The variety in packet size is needed to measure 
the impact of packet size variation during data 
transmission in order to maintain end-to-end network 
performance [29].      
IV. IPV6 TUNNELING MECHANISMS 
In this section three different configurations are 
considered; IPv6 tunneling, Dynamic host 
configuration protocol (DHCP) with a router 
advertisement daemon (radvd) and Internet Protocol 
Security Virtual Private Network (IPSec VPN). 
A. IPv6 tunneling  configuration 
This configuration will allow connection from our 
IPv6 local area network (LAN) using native IPv4 
gateway provided by Internet service provider (ISP). 
Table I shows a detailed configuration for the 
Router#3 to support IPv6 tunneling over ISP native 
IPv4. 
B. DHCP with Radvd Configuration 
All clients in the experiment were provided with 
automatic IP addresses by using DHCP server and 
radvd is used to implement a link-local 
advertisements as IPv6 routing prefixes to all clients. 
Details of the DHCP server and radvd configurations 
are shown in Table II.  
C. IPSec with 3DES VPN Configuration 
The platform under study involves an Ubuntu 
Linux operating system and IPSec implementation 
using OpenSwan [11] with 3DES encryption 
algorithm. The VoIP client routers are installed and 
configured with the commands shown in Table III.  
TABLE I. TUNNELING IPV6 OVER IPV4 ISP ROUTER 
Command Function 
nano /etc/network/interface 
auto he-ipv6 
iface he-ipv6 inet6 v4tunnel 
endpoint 216.66.80.26 
address fec0::244 
netmask 64 up ip -6 route add 
default dev he-ipv6 
down ip -6 route del default dev 
he-ipv6 
IP configuration to 
allow IPv6 tunnel 
connection via IPv4 for 
Router#3. 
nano /etc/sysctl.conf 
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 
Allows all IPv6 traffic 
through Router#3 
to/from LAN clients. 
TABLE II.  DHCP AND RADVD COMMANDS 
Command Function 
sudo apt-get install isc-dhcp-server Install IPv6 DHCP 
server 
nano /etc/dhcp/dhcpd6.conf 
option domain-name 
"dhcpv6.com"; 
option domain-name-servers 
ns.dhcpv6.com; 
default-lease-time 600; 
max-lease-time 7200; 
log-facility local7; 
subnet6 fec0::/64 { 
    range6 fec0::100 fec0::110;} 
host specialclient { 
    host-identifier option 
dhcp6.client-id 
1f:ba:e3:60:b9:1f:01:23:45; 
fixed-address6 fec0::1 
IPv6 address Pool and 
fix IP for Router #1  
and Router #2 
Nano /etc/radvd.conf 
interface eth0 {  
        AdvSendAdvert on; 
        MinRtrAdvInterval 3;  
        MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
        prefix fec0::/64 {  
                AdvOnLink on;  
                AdvAutonomous on;  
                AdvRouterAddr on;  
        }; 
}; 
Configuration of 
daemon to send 
advertisements through 
specified interfaces and 
auto-configures 
addresses with received 
prefix using the default 
route. 
 
 
TABLE III.  CONFIGURATION COMMANDS OF VOIP ROUTERS  
Command Function 
apt-get install openswan xl2tpd 
ppp  
Install OpenSwan IPSec 
on both VoIP client side 
nano /etc/ipsec.conf 
        auto=start 
        keyingtries="0" 
        connaddrfamily="ipv6" 
  
        leftid="router1" 
        left="fec0::1" 
        3des-cbc 
  leftrsasigkey="0sAJKX....hIm"    
Router#1 (VoIP Client 
1) configuration files of 
settings, option defaults 
and connection. 
nano /etc/ipsec.conf  
       auto=start 
        keyingtries="0" 
        connaddrfamily="ipv6" 
        rightid="router2" 
        right=" fec0::2 
        3des-cbc 
rightrsasigkey="0sAJKX....hIm" 
Router#2 (VoIP Client2) 
configuration files of 
settings, option defaults 
and connection. 
/etc/init.d/ipsec start Start OpenSwan in 
Router#1 and Router#2  
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Four different types of network traffic have been 
tested, which are IPv4 VoIP open system, IPv4 VoIP 
with IPSec, IPv6 VoIP open system and IPv6 with 
IPSec. By using 100mbps available bandwidth, a 
variety of packet size has been transmitted. Network 
throughput, mean jitter and packet loss were recorded 
with the influence of variable UDP background 
traffic size generated by PackETH, packet traffic 
generator starting from 0mbps, 50mbps, 100mbps, 
150mbps and  200mbps  traffic  overload.  By using  
Jperf,  UDP  data transmission from client #1 to 
client #2 during VoIP call setup, variable packet size 
was generated to perform and create overloaded links 
and enabled us to compare VoIP performance for 
IPv4 and IPv6 under heavy traffic and extreme 
conditions.  
Fig. 3 shows the mean jitter recorded by Jperf 
when we tested with different sizes of UDP packets 
sent from end to end (Client #1 to client #2). It shows 
that VoIP, for both IPv4 and IPv6 was affected by the 
implementation of IPSec security, where the security 
payload imposed on IP packet increased the jitter. 
However the effect was still acceptable for VoIP 
services on IPv4 and IPv6 networks. 
In Fig. 4, experimental results show that, IPv6 
with IPSec on a smaller packet size, which was 384 
bytes had the lowest  network throughput, but it 
increased slightly faster when a larger packet size 
was transmitted. The IPv4 VoIP open system had a 
higher throughput almost for all packet sizes 
transmitted compared to other different types of 
network traffic tested in this experiment.  
Fig. 5 shows the packet loss ratio when the 
generated UDP background traffic was varied in the 
range of 0 to 200 Mbps. Starting from 100mbps 
background traffic, packet loss started for all VoIP 
traffic except IPv4 VoIP open system. The highest 
packet loss occurred, which was 200mbps UDP 
background traffic on IPv6 with IPsec. Packet loss 
ratio with IPv6 as higher than IPv4 network traffic 
when dealing with bigger UDP background traffic, 
thus, IPv6 networks may need to be improved in the 
future to support better network quality of services. 
There will be a trade-off that need to be 
considered in order to achieve a balance between 
service quality and secure communications. 
However, for multimedia streaming and VoIP in 
lossy networks, QoS mainly depends on the 
encryption type and network status [30], [31]. The 
results indicate that VPN using 3DES encryption 
algorithms contribute to the performance degradation 
on both IPv4 and IPv6 which related to the size of 
data that been transmitted during network 
communication. The security packet payload cause 
by IPSec will imposed to the increment on the size of 
the original IP header, hence time required to encrypt 
and decrypt the payload and the header (execution 
time) also will affecting to the jitter and network 
throughput.  
Fig. 3. Jitter comparison between IPv6 VoIP and IPv4 VoIP, with 
and without IPSec. 
 
Fig. 4. Throughput comparison between IPv6 VoIP and IPv4  
VoIP, with and without IPSec.  
 
Fig. 5. Packet loss ratio comparison between IPv6 VoIP and IPv4 
VoIP, with and without IPSec.  
Network application and background traffic also 
will cause to increments of packet loss ratio, 
increasing UDP background traffic up to 200Mbps 
exceeded the maximum bandwidth and the network 
physical limitation in this case (100Mbps). By 
increasing the bandwidth and network physical, it can 
eliminate the packet loss ratio and improves QoS.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented an IPv6 tunneling 
mechanism  for  VoIP security, using 3DES 
encryption algorithm. Impact of implementing these 
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mechanism on the network performance has been 
compared to that of previously reported network 
based on IPv4. Variations of UDP packet size and 
background traffic with and without IPSec were 
considered in this study. Ekiga softphone running on 
the Ubuntu operating system was used for VoIP 
services on both clients and several parameters such 
as network throughput, jitter and packet loss ratio 
have been measured. Results showed that  IPv6 with 
IPSec using 3DES encryption has a slightly higher 
jitter, lower throughput and higher packet loss ratio 
as compared to the other IPv4 and IPv6 traffic tested 
on the test bed. Nonetheless, it can still be considered 
negligible for VoIP traffic. However, the 
implementation of IPv6 and IPSec imposes larger 
packet size, additional security payload and thus it is 
expected to slightly increase  the CPU and memory 
resources. Additional UDP background traffic may 
also contribute to degradation in network 
performance and voice quality as heavy overloaded 
network conditions up to 200mbps will rapidly 
increase the packet loss ratio. 
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